Por Que os Magros Falham Ao Ganhar Peso?Sua gordura estava pressionando em seu ouvido interno. Apenas carne, peixe, vegetais e vinho bem … crosta de torrada de vez em quando. A dieta funcionou e receitas anabolicas proteinas problemas, incluindo as dificuldades auditivas, receitas anabolicas proteinas. Inspirado, ele publicou o primeiro livro de dieta de baixo teor de carboidratos emLetter on Corpulence. Ele chamou a unidade de medida de uma caloria. A DuPont contratou o Dr.
Por Que os Magros Falham Em Ganhar Peso?
To say that the histories and conceptual frameworks of Michel Foucault have, since the late s, heavily influenced feminist theory is an understatement. On the other hand, one might add that the influence of Foucault on feminist jurisprudence and feminist legal theory has been much less pronounced, in spite of the obvious value of Foucault's work for critical legal theory more generally.
And yet, when a 'new Foucault' - the Italian political philosopher Giorgio Agamben - hit the critical legal scene in the late nineties, one might argue that a new kind of feminist legal theory was quickly born; one that was receptive and subtly attentive to the work of both Foucault and Agamben. And this in spite of the fact that Agamben's legal subjects are, like Foucault's, utterly sexless. What might explain this phenomenon? Here, we suggest that Agamben's work on law and citizenship, in focusing exclusively on Foucault's concept of biopolitics , and therefore on questions of the regulation of populations rather than of individual bodies, represents a point of departure that is particularly 'user friendly' for feminist legal theory.
We would also argue that feminist legal scholars need not be disturbed by Agamben's apparent sex blindness - as earlier scholars were by the sex blindness of Foucault.
While it is not possible, due to limits of space, to do justice to the full impact Agamben's work has had on Foucauldian scholarship, it seems important to mention here a particular dimension of his theoretical manner of working, which in some sense constitutes a thread running through all his works on political and legal theory, namely the idea of a zone of indistinction: The zone of indistinction is an immediate effect of a regime of justice and rights in which all legal categories are derived from a politics founded in biology.
Such a regime, which Foucault named the biopolitical state, is primarily concerned with the questions of whether a being is alive or dead; whether it lives or dies; how long it can, or should live; in what manner it will die; how healthy it is in its state of life, and so on.
The reduction of all living beings to biological organisms under biopolitical regimes which, for Foucault and Aagmben, refers to all the populations of modern states - with the late eighteenth century as the key moment of historical transformation accompanies the collapse of traditional political distinctions Bare life is the term Agamben uses to denote life that may be killed or preserved arbitrarily, developed from Agamben's revisionist work on Hannah Arendt's discussion of the political category of the refugee in The Origins of Totalitarianism.
It is not difficult to imagine ways in which Agamben's framework, which does not recognize the legal categories of public and private, might speak to feminist legal perspectives, which dismantled these artificial distinctions of liberal political theory years ago. This category has invited feminist theorists to ponder the gender implications of a political theory of law that sees politics as the reduction of all citizens to their 'bare' biological functions what Foucault referred to as the bestialization of man .
In a recent edited collection of essays entitled The Agamben Effect ,  Penelope Deutscher asks the critical question: What different inflections of life and of politicized life would result from an intermittent insertion 'born of women's bodies'? Life, in an Agambenesque world, according to Deutscher, is life dissociated entirely from women's reproductivity. Yet, it is perhaps this very dissociation of woman from the theory that strikes Deutscher as the key to its potential for feminist theory; an intriguing potential , she writes, to operate as a lens to rethink the terms life, bare life, threshold, and biopolitics.
If we were to intervene in order to reformulate Deutscher's hypothesis regarding the "potential" in Agamben's work for feminist theory, it would be as follows: The theory, as it stands, sex blind as it is, is committed to an analysis of bodies in relation to the legal thresholds between life and death, animate and inanimate, human and inhuman, nature and culture.
In short, biopolitical theory cannot avoid making the female body central to its analysis of human life as an undefined essence both protected and unprotected by law.
Against this our argument, Deutscher might justifiably reply, as indeed she makes clear in her essay, that Agamben's analysis, while enabling a legal analysis that occupies a ghostly proximity to feminist analysis, nevertheless contains a 'non accidental' sex blindness, which fails in its feminism, just as sex blind legal and political theory has always failed in its feminism.
The bracketed " and as " is crucial here. What we are to understand from Miller's analysis is that contemporary jurisprudence in modern times has been dedicated to the legal construction of a subject that not only occupies political space as a biological, reproductive animal, but which is biopolitical space - which for Miller means the womb.
The womb, and by logical extension, the womb-owner is, in Miller's analysis, the paradigmatic citizen or what she calls "the neutral citizen" of the modern biopolitical state. She writes, and we quote this highly important passage at length by way of conclusion,. In Miller, this point is made using a biopolitical framework derived from Foucault and Agamben to argue that the modern biopolitical state automatically places biological reproduction at the center of what it means to be a political citizen.
Her thesis uses Agamben's theoretical framework to illustrate the paradigmatic status of the female citizen as womb owner , rather than correcting his framework for its lack of attention to bodily markers of sexual difference. In fact, Miller even goes as far as to critique feminist political theory for a kind of sex blindness; one which assumes that the neutral citizen is male, thereby confusing liberal political fantasy with biopolitical reality.
Is it possible that an 'Agamben effect' in critical legal theory is facilitating a new understanding of citizenship, according to which it is the female reproductive body which represents the universal paradigmatic subject of law? As such, feminist legal theory might usefully serve as a tool for analysing the relentless inclusion of women in the biopolitical state.
Federation Press, 2nd ed. Owens eds , Sexing the Subject of Law. Stanford, California , New York , Agamben, Homo Sacer, The status of the overcomatose person is politicized by Agamben when he asks: What was the zone of life beyond coma? Who or what is the overcomatose person? Miller, The Limits of Bodily Integrity ,